Bountyloop
Proof infrastructure for vulnerability reports

Bountyloop turns security claims into executable proof.

Anyone can generate a vulnerability report now. Bountyloop determines whether the vulnerability actually exists — it reproduces the exploit in a sandbox, shields the edge, proves the block (data before, 403 after), drafts the fix, and authorizes the bounty only on a signed proof. Don't triage claims. Verify exploits.

Authorized on proof
$1,250
across 5 signed records: 5 SIMULATED
Bountyloop fees · 20% on proven bugs only: $0 SIMULATED · no Stripe charge yet
False payouts
0
proof required, vs 20 for text-only triage on a synthetic 60-item corpus SIMULATED
outcomes set in code; it illustrates the policy, not a measurement
Shield: detection → control enforced
6s
test requests 12/12 → 0/12 (4 kinds), invoice still sent recorded LOCAL run
The person
A founding engineer at a five-person SaaS. No security team. The security@ inbox is theirs alone.
The real problem
Each report costs 30 min–2 h of senior time to triage, and AI-generated “beg-bounties” now flood the inbox — duplicates and fakes outnumber real bugs. (ZeroPath)
Why it matters
Real vulnerabilities rot for weeks while fakes get answered; honest researchers wait months for a payout.
The mechanism
Proven-bug payout: money moves only after the flaw is reproduced in a sandbox, the edge is shielded, and the block is verified with a 403.
How it’s used
In a pilot: point it at your repo and deploy target, fund a pool, set a cap. Researchers submit; you’re interrupted only for a critical shield or a refusal you should see.
The impact
Fakes get $0 with a written reason in seconds; real bugs are reproduced, shielded and verified, the fix is drafted, and the bounty authorized, in one loop. The verified-proof ledger is your compliance artifact.

Second trigger · the Shield

CISA KEV

No report needed when attackers are already using the flaw.

When CISA adds a flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list, Bountyloop checks whether your app runs the affected version (OSV), looks for the flawed path in code (Semgrep) and at the edge (one harmless test request), then applies one pre-approved, reversible edge control, checks customers can still work, and retires it when your patch is reported.

recorded LOCAL run · versions DECLARED (demo company) · server functions emulated · phone + patch SIMULATED
KEV   CVE-2025-55182  React Server Components  ransomware: known
OSV   react-server-dom-webpack@19.1.0 (DECLARED) → GHSA-fv66-9v8q-g76r
SAST  3 server functions found (Semgrep CE: evidence, not proof)
EDGE  test request reaches the emulated decoder: 3 routes
DENY  take the app offline → policy refuses, phone asks Maya (SIMULATED)
APPLY BL-CTL-WEB-REQUIRE-SESSION-FOR-ACTIONS
CHECK test requests blocked (no / forged / garbage session, form post) · invoice sent ✓
RETIRE reported 19.1.2 (SIMULATED deploy) → OSV re-check → control removed

Recent verified proofs

Full ledger →
CaseClassSeverityResearcherAuthorizedSignature
BL-1031access_controlcritical@mara-k$2505b0a68d4d2fe290e0c…
BL-1020access_controlhigh@fuzzmoth$2508e019bb5099c34003e…
BL-1013rate_limitmedium@quietfuzz$250db91eebbbf8da11017…
BL-1001secret_exposuremedium@j0lt$250629587b10c6a2d8e6c…
BL-0996access_controlhigh@mara-k$250364d9539bca0c66f6b…